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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
FRANK D. WATKINS and VENIA 
WATKINS, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
GLEN M. SIMONDS and BEVERLY 
J. SIMONDS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
STATEME.NT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9131 
This is an action to quiet title in an Easement by Way 
of Necessity of an irrigation ditch, or in the alternative, as 
being within the express grant of a utility easement, said 
ditch running over the defendants' property and connecting 
to the plaintiffs' property, both of which are located in 
Block 2, Holladay I-I eights Plat "A" Subdivision, located 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
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Plaintiffs also asked for damages and injunctive relief 
for the purpose of re-opening said ditch closed by defen• 
dants. 
A Temporary Restraining Order was issued by the 
court on June 12, 1958 and made permanent for the dura-
tion of the action on September 10, 1958. 
Defendants filed an Answer September 17, 1958. 
On March 5, 1959 defendants made a motion for Sum-
mary Judgment. On April 2, 1959 plaintiffs filed an 
Amended Complaint. On April 7, 1959 defendants filed an 
Answer to the Amended Complaint. On July 27, 1959 plain-
tiffs filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The Motions for Summary Judgment were heard be-
fore the court on July 16, 1959 and were taken under ad• 
visement and leave given the plaintiffs to submit a Mem-
orandum of Authorities by July 20, 1959 and for defen-
dants' answering Memorandum by July 23, 1959. On July 
31, 1959, the court signed an Order filed July 31, 1959, 
granting Summary Judgment to the defendants. 
On August 10, 1959 a Second Amended Complaint was 
filed and on August 11, 1959, plaintiffs made a Motion to 
Set Aside the Summary Judgment, To Amend and To Main-
tain the· Status Quo. On August 24, 1959 plaintiffs made 
a Motion for a new trial, to alter the Summary Judgment 
and for leave to amend the Complaint. On August 11, 1959 
the court reinstated the Restraining Order previously effec-
tive during the pendency of the action. 
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Upon stipulation of parties the court entertained argu-
ment on plaintiffs' Motions without notice on August 28, 
1959, at which time a new Second Amended Complaint was 
proffered by plaintiffs, and upon stipulation of parties the 
court ordered that it reiate back to August 10, 1959 when 
the original Second Amended Complaint was filed and con-
sidered in lieu of the said original Second Amended Com-
plaint for all purposes herein. Considering this new Second 
Amended Complaint in connection with the argument of 
counsel on the 28th day of August, 1959, the court denied 
plaintiffs' Motions to amend, to alter the Summary Judg-
ment and for a new trial. 
On August 29, 1959, plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal. 
Had this matter been permitted to go to trial on its 
merits plaintiffs maintain that the pleadings show and the 
evidence would have revealed the following facts: 
That the property which later came to be known as 
Block 2 of Holladay H·eights Plat "A" Subdivision was irri-
gated farm land and that a ditch which ran in a north-south 
direction through the middle of said Block had existed for 
some period of time in excess of 30 years, which ditch was 
used to carry irrigation water through the Block from 
which laterals extended irrigating the tract. That said 
property was owned and the ditch so used by Mr. Wilford 
Seequist until 1947, at which time the property was subdi-
vided and an official plat of said subdivision was filed in the 
office of the Salt Lake County Recorder in July of that 
year. 
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That Alliance Realty and Building Company, who par-
ticipated in the subdivision, acquired the lots. in Block 2, 
specifically Lots 6 and 3, through a Contract of Purchase 
some time prior to November 1, 1948. That plaintiffs ob-
tained title to Lot 6, Block 2, October, 1954, and defendants 
obtained Lot 3, Block 2, January, 1955. 
Upon subdivision the above noted ditch ran through the 
rear of what came to he known as Lots 3 and 6 of the said 
Block 2. During the course of construction of homes on 
the lots in the said Block 2, debris and foreign matter were 
deposited in the said ditch. Some time around July 1, 1~52, 
the said ditch was cleared out at the direction of Alliance 
Realty and Building Company and Wendell A. Livingston, 
who were two of the subdividers. 
That during the period 1948 through 1959 the direc-
tion of flow of water through the said ditch changed three 
times (See Map R. 50), but only the one ditch over the rear 
of Lot 3 was used and the use was continuous. 
The ditch in question was apparent, obvious and visible 
to the defendants and their mesne grantor who took from 
Alliance Realty and Building Company, and to plaintiffs 
and their mesne grantor, who took from Alliance Realty 
and Building Company. 
Evidence would have shown that the use of the ditch 
was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of plaintiffs' 
estate on Lot 6, and that no other practical means of con-
veying plaintiffs' water to their property is available. 
There would be additional evidence showing that at 
the time of subdividing a "utility easement" was created 
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across the rear five feet of the lots in Block 2 and that said 
ditch was within the five-foot easement, and it was the 
intention of the subdividers to consider the ditch a utility. 
Additional facts (admitted in the defendants' Answers) 
would have been that the defendants filled in the said ditch 
at the rear of Lot 3 and fenced off the same. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING A SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO THE DE-
FENDANTS. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUS-
ING TO PERMIT PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND 




THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANT-
ING A SUMlVIARY JUDGMENT TO THE DE-
FENDANTS. 
(a) Defendants apparently were granted Summary 
Judgment in this matter as a result of inconsistencies be-
tween the plaintiffs' pleadings and their Memorandum of 
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Authorities. However, it is plaintiffs' contention that, 
viewed as a whole, in spite of the inconsistencies, the record 
states a cause of action on which relief could be granted, 
and accordingly, a trial of the matter on its merits should 
have been permitted. 
The inconsistencies are as follows: First, paragraph 
4 (a) of the Amended Complaint (R. 13 and 14) states the 
ditch in question was "constructed" in 1952; second, that 
plaintiffs' Memorandum (R. 41) shows a unity of title in 
Wilford Seequist, and the chains of title listed make it 
appear that Alliance Realty and Building Company had 
divested itself of Lot 6 prior to its acquisition of Lot 3 be-
fore the ditch was "constructed". In addition, the state-
ments in the Memorandum referring to the map attached 
to plaintiffs' lVIemorandum and the map itself (R. 41 and 
50) might give the implication that three ditches were in 
use during the period of time in question. 
Defendants, in their Memorandum, ignored paragraphs 
2 (b) and 11 of the Amended CompJaint (R. 12, 13 and 16) 
which alleged the existence and use of the ditch for a per-
iod of more than 21 years. Further, these facts are referred 
to specifically in plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum, point three 
( R. 55) . Also ignored were the allegations of paragraph 
5 (a) of the Amended Complaint (R. 14) which allege that 
Alliance Realty and Building Company was the common 
grantor of both the plaintiffs and defendants. 
While it is unfortunate that the Amended Complaint, 
with reference to the clearing of the ditch in 1952, uses the 
word "constructed", it wouLd seem apparent in read-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
7 
ing the entire Amended Complaint, that the purpose of para-
graphs 2, 3 and 4, and the map (R. 12, 13, 14 and 50) was 
designed to show the change in direction and flow of the 
water in the same ditch over the time period in question. 
Defendants further maintained that, based upon the 
allegations in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and Memor-
andum, the water flowed in a northward direction rather 
than a southward direction for a period of time, thus mak-
ing Lot 3 dominant and Lot 6 a s·ervient estate, and thereby 
extinguishing any possible right of necessity. It is the 
plaintiffs' position that direction of flow of the water is 
not determinative of which estate is dominant or servient. 
A recent and leading case on the subj.ect which com-
piles much of the Utah and foreign law on ways of necessity 
is Adamson vs. Brockbank, 112 Utah 52, 185 P. 2d 264. The 
case rules that the burdens and rights unde·r ways of neces-
sity are reciprocal and once established cannot be interfered 
with by the o-vvners of either the servient or dominant es-
tate, and quotes with approval the case of Phillips· vs. Phil-
lips, 48 Penn. 178, 86 Am. Dec. 577 in the following lan-
guage: 
"Servitudes, adopted by the owner of land, 
which are plainly visible or notorious, and from the 
character of which it may fairly be presumed that 
he intended their preservation as necessary to the 
convenient enjoyment of his property, become, when 
the lands are divided and pass into other hands per-
manent appurtenances thereto, and the owner of 
neither the dominant nor s·ervient portions of the 
land has power adversely to interfere with their 
proper use and enjoyment." 
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The Adamson case further spells out in summary the 
elements needed to establish an easement by right of nece-s-
sity in the following language: 
"The elements essential to constitute an ease-
ment by severance a.re: ( 1) Unity of title followed 
by severance; (2) That at the tim.e of the severance 
the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible; 
(3) That the easement is reasonably necessary to 
the enjoyment of the dominant estate; and. ( 4) It 
must usually be continuous and self-acting, as dis-
tinguished from one used only from time to time 
when occasion arises." 
By that standard, (plaintiffs' Memorandum, notwith-
standing) the Amended Complaint, does in fact state a cause 
of action, to-wit: (1) Unity of title is alleged in paragraph 
5 (a) of the Complaint (R. 14). (2) Existence of the ditch 
at the time of the severance is alleged in paragraphs 2 (b) 
and 4 (a) (R. 12, 13 and 14) ; and that it was visible and 
apparent is alleged in paragraphs 5 (b) (R. 14). (3) That 
the easement is "reasonably necessary" is alleged in para-
graph 8 (R. 15). (4) That there has been continuous and 
self-acting use is alleged in paragraph 2 (b) (R. 12 and 13). 
At the time of argument, with regard to the unity of 
title discrepancy, counsel for plaintiffs relied on the case 
of Hubbard vs Littlefield, 128 A. 285, 38 A. L. R. 1306, 
wherein is found the language: 
"If, * * * this unity of ownership is shown 
to have existed, its remoteness here in point of time, 
or by reason of intervening conveyances, is imma-
terial." 
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Similar holdings were also cited in the cases of Taylor 
vs. Warnaky, 59 Cal. 350, and Logan vs. Stagsdale, 123 Ind. 
372, 24 N. E. 235, 8 L. R. A. 58. In the argument, counsel 
for plaintiffs conceded that the word "constructed" in the 
Amended Complaint would better have been "cleared out" 
or "cleaned of debris", but that the ditch running across 
the rear of Lot 3 had been in continuous existence and 
use for some 35 or more years past, prior to the defendants' 
act in closing said ditch. 
Also, at the time of argument, counsel for plaintiffs 
argued that defendants' objection concerning the direction 
of flow of water was untena:ble. While it was admitted by 
plaintiffs that during the ten-year period immediately prior 
to the litigation, water had entered the ditch in question 
at three different points. and flowed either north to south 
or south to north, or for a period beginning at Lot 3 and 
flowing in both northerly and southerly directions, this 
was not in and of itself a negation of the existence of the 
ditch and of the way of necessity over it for the benefit of 
contiguous lots. Counsel cited the Adamson case noted 
above with its citation from Phillips vs. Phillips, also noted 
above. 
With regard to each of these elements, counsel for 
plaintiffs advised the court that it was aware that such 
matters would have to be substantiated with evidence and 
that they were prepared to produce such evidence to prove 
the truth of the allegations. The issue at that time before the 
court, however, was sufficiency of the allegations them-
selves, not the proof thereof. 
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Since the T'rial Court granted the Summary Judgment, 
it must be concluded that the court felt that the allegations 
in the Amended ·Complaint were insufficient to state a cause 
of action. Counsel for plaintiffs-appellants here maintain 
that such holding was error. 
(b) In granting defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, the District Court apparently ruled that the 
ditch in question, as a matter of liaw, was not a utility suf-
ficient to come within the express utility easement dedi-
cated and recorded by the subdividers. The question as to 
whether or not the said ditch was a utility and whether or 
not the subdividers intended it so to be considered, plain-
tiffs maintain it is not solely a question of law but one of 
fact and is a valid cause of action, and was so pleaded by the 
plaintiffs in their Amended Complaint, paragraph 9 (b) (R. 
15 and 16). 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT . COURT ERRED IN REFUS-
ING TO PERMIT PLAINTIFFS TO AMEND 
THEIR COMPLAINT FOLLOWING THE SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT. 
When counsel for the plaintiffs learned of the court's 
intention to uphold the defendants' selective view of the 
facts alleged, plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Com-
plaint (R. 34-39) on August lOth; and on August 11th filed 
their Motion to S.et Aside the Summary Judgment, To 
Amend, and To Maintain the Status Quo. The Motions and 
Second Amended Complaint were considered by the court 
on August 28th and denied apparently on the ground they 
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came too late. Counsel for plaintiffs maintain that this is 
contrary to the liberal construction this court has given 
to the provisions of Rule 15 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, relating to amendment of pleadings. 
Counsel for plaintiffs call the court's attention to the 
fact that a copy of the Summary Judgment signed by the 
District Judge was served upon the plaintiffs by mailing 
a copy of it on the day prior to its being signed and filed 
(R. 26), which makes such copy no more than an unsigned 
proposed judgment and which raises the question as to 
whether it constitutes notice of the judgment at all. In any 
event, such notice by mail under the terms of Rule 6 (e) 
extends the time within which opposing motions must be 
filed for three days ; hence, the filing of the Motion to Set 
Aside the Summary Judgment and To Amend on August 
11th was seasonably filed, and the District Court erred in 
denying those motions. 
Counsel further urge that this Court take notice of 
the fact that the custom of the courts in this jurisdiction 
is to specify a time within which to amend in the Summary 
Judgment itself, or to reinstate the action upon the season-
able filing of an Amended Complaint. In this case the 
Second Amended Complaint was filed on the lOth day (Aug-
ust 10, 1959) after entry of the judgment. 
Certainly, in view of the fact that the offered pleading 
was filed as of August 10, 1959, it would be in the further-
ance of justice to allow the same to be considered by the 
Court and a trial granted thereon. This is in keeping with 
the statement of this Court in Bonneville Lumber Company 
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vs. J. G. Peppard Seed Company, 72 U. 463, at page 471, 
271 Pac. 226, at page 229 : 
"Amendments to pleadings, when seasonably 
proposed, are generally allowed with great liberality. 
When not seasonably proposed, it should be made to 
appear that they are at least offered in furtherance 
of justice." 
In the case of Hancock vs. Luke, 46 Utah 26, at page 
37, 148 P. 452, the court permitted an amendment to an 
Answer even after judgment on the pleadings had been 
granted, in the following language: 
"In case pleadings are assailed, must a party 
move to amend before he is apprised of what the rul-
ing of the court will be? We think not. We are of 
the opinion, therefore, that the motion for leave to 
amend was time1y. We are also of the opinion that, 
under the circumstances, it constituted reversible 
error for the court to deny the motion for leave to 
amend. It is quite clear that it was the intention of 
the attorney who drew the answer to deny the allega-
tions of the complaint respecting fraud and the mis-
representations as well as some of the other allega-
tions. It is equally apparent that, in the opinion of 
the· District Court, he had failed to do that. It is 
also clear that, in pleading the affirmative matters 
contained in the answer, the pleader left many of 
them in doubt by failing to make clear and concise 
statements. All those statements, as well as the de-
nials, were amendable, however, and, if properly 
amended, might set forth a defense to the cause of 
action, to some extent at least, either negative or 
affirmative. Wha~t we mean is that it cannot be said 
in advance that the answer could not be so amended, 
as to set forth at least a partial defense to the mat-
ters set forth in the complaint. If, in this case, 
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plaintiff had interposed a general demurrer to the 
answer, and the court had sustained it, the defen-
dants would have been permitted to amend their 
answer as a matter of course under the practice, if 
not as a matter of absolute right. This is the view 
that is taken by the author of Pomeroy's Code Rem-
edies (4th Ed.), Section 454. * * * Is there 
any reason for a different rule in case of a motion 
for judgment on the pleadings? We confess our in-
ability to discover any substantial difference be-
tween a general demurrer and a motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings, in so far as. the right to 
amend is concerned." 
Counsel for plaintiffs maintain that this case is clearly 
in point. While the case was decided prior to the existence 
of Rule 15 (a) it deals with the same subject matter, and 
so far as counsel are able to determine, has never been over-
ruled or distinguished by this court, and the notation of the 
case itself still continues to appear in the annotations under 
Rule 15 (a) in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Also relevant is the case of Peterson vs. Union Pacific 
Railroad Company, 79 Utah 213, 8 P. 2d 627, whe-rein is 
stated at page 221 the following: 
"There is applicable to cases of this kind the 
rule that a pleading should be liberally construed 
with a view to substantial justice between the par-
ties, Comp. Laws Utah 1917, Section 6596; Grover 
vs. Cash, 69 Utah 194, 253 P. 676 ; note 8 A. L. R. 
1406 ; especially where there is reasonable ground 
for holding that the amendment is an amplification 
of allegations already stated, Clinchfield R. Co. vs. 
Dunn (C. C. A.) 40 F. 2d 586, 74 A. L. R. 1276, the 
courts not being disposed to a technical or narrow 
construction where the transaction alleged in the 
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amendment is the same as in the original Complaint, 
Texas & P. R. Co. vs. Cox, 145 U. S. 593, 12 S. Ct. 
905, 36 L. Ed. 829." 
Counsel for plaintiffs further wish to call the court's 
attention to the case of Provo City, et al. vs. Claudin, et al., 
91 Utah 60, 63 P. 2d 570, wherein the Court said: 
"It must be noted that the court may, upon sus-
taining a demurrer, refuse to permit an amendment 
to a pleading if it deems no amendment can be made 
which will circumvent the ruling. The implications 
of Section 104-14-3 so speak. In such case, the 
pleader is virtually out of court. It is as if the court 
had said, 'Your pleading is not good in law and, 
under the facts as I apprehend they can be pleaded, 
you cannot state a good action or defense in law.' 
Naturally, it is not usually done on a first Complaint 
or Answer because the court cannot ordinarily know 
that other facts to make the pleading good cannot 
be pleaded. And a refusal to permit pleading O'Ver 
where it do-es not appear positive that no cause of 
action or defense can be pleaded may run easily into 
an abuse of discretion." (Emphasis added.) 
Under the doctrine of the Peterson case noted above, it 
is to be observed that the Second Amended Complaint does 
not state any new cause of action, but rather amplifies the 
causes of action originally stated in the Amended Complaint, 
and in particular, alleges at paragraph 3 (R. 34 and 35) 
unity of title in the Alliance Realty and Building Company; 
at paragraphs 4 and 5 (R. 35), that one ditch was in use 
continuously for 50 years or more last past; at paragraph 
6 (R. 35) that the ditch was plain, obvious and visible, and 
defendants had know ledge of said ditch and took subject 
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thereto; and in paragraph 7 (R. 35), reasonable necessity 
is alleged. 
Under the doctrine of the Provo City case above cited, 
since the Second Amended Complaint does clearly state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, failure of the Dis-
trict Court in exercising its discretion to permit such 
amendment amounts to an abuse of discretion. 
Whether or not this court is disposed to view the 
amended Complaint as a valid pleading, clearly the Second 
Amended Complaint refused by the District Court elimin-
ates the seeming discrepancies in plaintiffs' Memorandum 
and Amended Complaint, and does in fact allege the nec-
essary elements to state· a cause of action, and the refusal 
of the District Court to permit the amendment was error. 
CONC'LUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs-appellants re-
spectfully request this court to reverse the Summary Judg-
ment of the District Court and set it aside with instructions 
to proceed with trial on the plaintiffs' Amended Complaint 
or in the alternative with instructions to permit the filing 
of the Second Amended Complaint with leave in the defen-
dants to answer said Second Amended Complaint and pro-
ceed to trial thereon. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Gordon A. Madsen, 
of ANDERSON, JARDINE 
and MADSEN, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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